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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah
KEITH 'VINEGAR, doing business
a::; Internwuntain Oil Distributors,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

No. 7780

vs.

SLIM OLSON, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Defendant and Respondant

STATEMENT
Appellant alleges, on page 3 and 4 of his brief, that
this action was to recover damages for the total loss of
a Diesel engine '·which loss was caused by reason of the
negligent installation of an oil filter bag by the defendant's employees.''
1
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'ro state the situation accurately, it was an action
to recover damages allegedly caused by reason of an alh~ged negligent installation of an oil filter bag by this
defendant's employees.
li1 acts pertinent, in addition to those stated by plaintiff and appellant in his brief, are:

Defendant denies any negligence and in turn alleged
in its answer that "if plaintiff's property, referred to in
said complaint, was damaged and plaintiff suffered any
loss thereby, said danmge and loss resulted from and was
proximately caused by plaintiff's own negligence or some
other intervening cause not the fault of defendant".
rrhe case was tried to the court sitting without a
jury. After plaintiff had completed the presentation of
his evidence and had rested, upon motion of defendant,
the court granted a non-suit. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of non-suit were thereafter
duly made and entered by the court. Rule 41 (b) and Rule
52 (a), Ut. Rules of civil procedure. Plaintiff's evidence
showed that the Diesel engine in question, an old 1932 or
1933 Model converted, was delivered to defendant's place
of business at Bountiful by plaintiff's agent, on the 24th
day of January, 1951, and that defendant furnished a
sump bag for which a charge was made as shown on
plaintiff's exhibit "A".
After it was serviced the vehicle was taken from
defendant's place of business, the same day, by plaintiff's agent, and used to haul heavy loads of oil ranging
from 4500 to 5700 gallons per load. It functioned normally until it had travelled 2190 miles. It should have been
serviced, as recommended, from 1500 to 2500 miles. It
2
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pulled loads up and down long hea.Yy grades part of the
time at speeds up to ;)U 1nile~ per hour. lt was in regular
:sen·iee pulling these heavy loads January :2~), :2u, :2~, 30,
;-u, and February 1, 1951. rrhe engine functioned perfedly nornml during that tiine. 'l'he oil placed in the engine
was furnished by the plaintiff and out of his own containers purchased fr01n Phillips 66 Oil C01npany.
Plaintifrs agent, a ~lr. \Voolslayer, \Vho drove the
unit in question and deliYered it to defendant for servicing, on the 24th day of January, ren1ained with it and
\Vatched defendant's en1ployees service it, he testified
it was his duty to re1nain with and watch it serviced. On
the night of February 1, 1951, the unit was driven from
plaintiff's place of business in Bountiful to the Standard
Oil Refinery in North Salt Lake City to load. As it approached the refinery, the driver heard a knocking noise .
..:\.fter it was loaded it was driven, with this load of 4625
gallons of oil, a mile south, then up highway 91 about a
mile and a half, with internrittant knocking noises, then
the oil pressure went down. A mechanic was called by
plaintiff's agent who came down to where the driver had
stopped it or parked off the highway. He started up
the motor and said it run Rinoothly or normally for two
or three minutes then he put it in gear and started up
the highway pulling the load. Shortly thereafter a severe
knocking occurred, the temperature rose suddenly; the
mechanic heard son1ething like a bearing going out and
the oil pressure left. The driver hadn't told the 1nechanic
what was wrong.
Plaintff claims that the damage resulted from a
plugged oil line from the sump to the engine. One of his
witnesses testified that he knew of no way the dmnage
3
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could have resulted except through a faulty installation
of the sump bag or filter. The court refused to permit
cross examination of this witness as to other possible
ways it could have resulted except upon penalty of being
bound by his answers. Other testilnony on cross examination showed there were other possible ways of causing
the damage than that suggested. The oil line between
the sump and the engine was not produced nor was there
any evidence of any examination of the oil line as to
whether it was clogged. The evidence indicated that a
part of the filter bag was wrinkled as if it had been
pulled into an opening when the motor was pulled down.
POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT No. I
The court did not err in granting a nonsuit in this
case.
POINT No. II
The court did not err in its Findings of Fact No.
V wherein the court found that the evidence of the plaintiff was insufficient to show that defendant failed to use
due and proper care and skill.
POINT No. III
The court did not err in entering a judgment of
nonsuit for the reason that said judgment is supported
by the Findings and Conclusions, and the Findings and
Conclusions are supported by the evidence and the law.
POINT No. IV
The court did not err in its Finding of Fact No. IY
in defining the duty of defendant as one to use due care
4
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and skill.
POINT No. Y
The court did not err in its Finding of Fact No. V
that defendant failed to use due or proper care and skill
and failed to ~how that defendant wa~ guilty of any
negligent acts.
POINT No. YI
The court did not err in its conclusion of law that
defendant i~ entitled to judg1nent of nonsuit.
ARur~lEXT

ON THE LA\V OF NONSUITS

Points ll and Yl inclusive relied upon by appellant
are and each of then1 is an integral part of his point
I and they will not be argued separately.
1. First, it should be pointed out that appellant

bases his case on appeal, on Title 104-29-1 ( 5), which
was repealed by Sec. 104-43-8 Laws of Utah 1951, and
superseded by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
more specifically Rule 41 (b), which said rules were
adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah effective January 1, 1950. Further, it will be noted that even under
the old code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff could not
prevail, as plaintiff's citation, relied upon in his brief,
are not in point and are not accurate or full citations,
and are taken from jury cases.
It is fundamental law that there is a basic distinction between jury and non-jury cases. In jury cases,
the court is trier of the law, and the jury is trier of the
facts. In the non-jury case, the court is trier of both the
law and the facts. The instant case was a non-jury trial

5
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~o that appellant's citations to support his appeal are
dearly distinguishable and do not apply to those case
even aside from Hule 41 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
~,he case cited in appellant's brief in paragraphs
1 ,2, and 3 of his argu1nent pages 7 and 8, Robinson vs.
Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 Pac 817 and decided in
1910 was a jury case. In Graham vs. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company, 79 Utah 1, 6 pac. (2d) 462, desided in 1931 and cited by appellant in his argmnent
paragraph 4, page 8 and page 28, it will be noted that
the case was one before a jury and clearly distinguishbale. The case also involved a directed verdict for defendant, and not a non suit, a further distinction, along
with the fact that plaintiff asked to reopen the case to
put on more evidence to cure the alleged defect in
his evidence, which request the trial court refused to
allow. The issue of the sufficiency of the motion for a
directed verdict was not raised on appeal, nor was the
question of nonsuit raised, so that any ruling on such
is dicta and not binding on this court.

In Valiates vs. Utah Apex :Mining Company, 55 Utah
151, 184 Pac. 802, decided in 1919 and cited in appellant's
brief in paragraph 5 of his argument on page 9, it will
be seen that this too was a jury case. It also concerned
a motion for nonsuit made by defendant which was overruled, again not in point. The court in this case stated
'' * * * * the trial eourt must give to plaintiff the benefit
of every fair and reasonable inference that might properly be drawn from the evidence by the jury * * * *".
(Italics ours) the Italicized words were left out of Appellant's brief on page 9.
6
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~umlley Y::i. H.io Grange \\' e::;tern Hail way C01npany,
;)4 l·tah 4~3, 98 Pac. 31, decided in 1908, and cited by appellant on page 29 was also a jury case and not in point.

Barlow Y::;. Salt Lake and U. R. C01npany, [)7 Utah
31:2, 194 P. lili5, decided in 19~0 and cited by appellant
on page 31 of his brief was a case tried before a jury
and further distinguished by the fact that appeal was
taken fr01n a refusal of the court to grant a nonsuit for
defendant, along with sixty-four other assign1nents of
error. It Inust be noted, that all of the citations from
An1. Juris. by appellant on pages 24, 25, and 26 of his
brief were based on cases and texts written before the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is
further noted that with the exception of appellants first
citation on page 24 of his brief, the stateinents taken
from the text concerned jury trials, with supporting citations taken from jury trials where the jury alone is trier
of the facts.
This appeal must be determined under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court, effective January 1, 1950, more specifically Rules
1 (a) Scope of Rules and 41 (b)

* * * * ''After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion
is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. In an action tried by
the court withmtt a jury the co1trt as trier of the facts
may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the
7
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court renders judgment upon the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall n1ake findings as provided in
Rule 52 (a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a disn1issal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in
this rule other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an adjucation upon the merits." (Italics ours).
This Rule, just cited, is verbatum with Rule 41 (b)
of the Federal Rules from which our rules were taken with
the exception that the. Federal Rules do not contain the
last sentence found in the Utah Rules.
Rule 1 A of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is essentially the same as Rule one of the Federal Rules and the
last sentence is verbatum with the last sentence of Federal Rule 1, except our Rule adds the word "liberally".
Our Rule so far as pertinent here reads as follows:

'' * * * * They shall be liberally construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.''
It is elemental law that when one jurisdiction adopts
a statute or law of another, the interpretation of the lending jurisdiction as it exists at the time of the borrowing,
will usually be adoped or at least be given very great
weight by the borrowing state. So it is with the Rule
and Interpretation of the rule which was borrowed by
this Court from the Federal Rules.
The latest case found interpreting Rule 41 (b) of
the Federal Rules is the United States vs. United States
Gypsu1n Co. 10 F. R. Serv. 41 (b) 14 Case 1, 67 Fed. Supp.
397, decided in 1946 by the District Court of the District of
8
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Colo1ubia. In thi::; case, defendant uwved for a nonsuit
and disn1issal at the end of plaintiff's case, on the
ground that upon the facts and the law, the plaintiffs
had shown no right to relief. (Italics ours). The
trial court granted the nwtion and plaintiff appealed.
In upholding the trial courts ruling the appellate court
stated:
.. A judge in a jury trial does not withdraw a case
frmn the jury on defendant's 1notion at the end of
plaintiff's case unless the judge can fairly say that
no reasonable jury 1nan could find for plaintiff * * *
But in an action tried without a jrury, the judge is
trier of both the facts and the law. r_}~his fundamental distinction between jury and nonjury trials
should not be ignored. * * * * Rule 1 expressly provides that the rules shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." * * * * (Italics ours).
(Utah Rules of Civil Procedure No. 1, as noted above,
includes the same provision).
''Therefore a court should dispose of a case at first
opportunity which is appropriate with the rules and
in accord with the rights of the parties. When a
court sitting without a jury, has heard all of the
plaintiff's evidence, it is appropriate that the court
shall then determine whether or not the plaintiff has
convincingly shown a right to relief. (Italics ours).
It is not reasonable to require a judge, on a motion
to dismiss under Rule 41 (b) to determine merely
whether there is a prima facie case, such as in a
jury trial should go to a jury, where there is
no jury - to determine merely whether there is a
9
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priina facie case sufficient for the consideration of
a trier of facts, when he is hiinself the trier of facts.
rro apply the jury trial practice in non-jury proceedings would be to erect a requirement compelling a
defendant to put on his case, and the court to spend
the ti1ne and incur the public expense of hearing it if
the plaintiff had, according to jury trial concepts,
umde a 'case for the jury' even though the judge had
concluded that on the whole of the plaintiff's evidence
the plaintiff ought not to prevail. A plaintiff who
has had full opportunity to put on his own case and
has failed to convince the judge, as a trier of the
facts, of a right to relief, has no legal right under
the due process clause of the constitution, to hear
the defendant's case, or compel the court to hear it,
1nerely because the plaintiff's case is a prima facie
one in the jury_ trial sense of the term. * * * * We
conclude that Rule 41 (b) it is the duty (Italics
ours) of the court to weigh the evidence, to draw
the inference therefrom, and, if it finds the evidence insufficient to make out a case for the plaintiff, to render a decision for the defendant on the
merits.''
No. 29 of the Syllabus reads :
''In Federal Courts, substantial evidence rather than
a mere scintilla is necessary to support judgment."
On page 451 of this decision the court further
said:
'' * * * * By substantial evidence is meant more than
a mere scintilla; it must do more than create a suspicion of the existance of the fact to be established.''
This case seems to be directly in point with the in10
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~taut l'a:::;e and lay:::; down the law for judgn1ents of non::mit under the new Rules of Procedure.

In Barr Y. Equitable Life Assurance ~oeiety of the
rnited ::;tate~, S F. R. Serv. -11 (b) .32 Case 1, 149 ~-,.
(:Zd) 634 appealed to the CCA 9th frmn the District Court
of the Xorthern District of California, Southern Division
and decided in 1945, it was held:
'· \Ve agree that there is evidence warranting the
inference of fact supporting the judg1nent. \Ve
assu1ne there it' testiinony fron1 which a contrary
inference nmy be drawn * * * * after the plaintiff
has cmnpleted the presentation of his evidence the
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may
n1oYe for a distnissal on the ground that 'upon the
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown not right
to relief." (Italics ours) .
In Bach v. Friden Calculatign Machine Co., Inc., 8
F. R. Serv. 41 (b) .14 case 2; 148 F. (2d) 407 CCA 6th
1945, the case was appealed from the District Court of
the United States, Southern District of Ohio, \Vestern
Division. Upon an appeal from the lower court granting
the defendant's motion to dismiss that under the facts
and the law, plaintiff had shown no right to relief, plaintiff appealed. The appellate court upheld the lower
courts ruling and stated as follows :
''Findings of Fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibilit:Y of the witnesses. * * * * It is clear that it was
intended (the adoption of the Rules) to give the
11
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trial court the power to weigh the evidence and draw
inferences therefrom at the conclusion of plaintiff's
proof, both in law and in equity.
When it is remeinbered that the purpose of the Rules
Practice is to expedite the trial of cases, it would
seem that the trial court should be able to dispose
of cases at the earliest opportunity and to this end
that it should have the power to weigh the evidence
and consider the law at the end of plaintiff's case
in jury-waived actions * * * * A plaintiff is deprived
of no right by such procedure and a defendant is
released of the burden of going forward, and no
Constitutional rights of either party is invaded.
* * * * In Young vs. U. S., 111 F. (2d) 823, 825 it
was held that the court would not disturb the findings of fact of the trial court unless they were clearly erroneous. * * * *
The sensible course to be followed in the trial of
cases by the court without a jury is that if, at the
close of the plaintiff's proof, his case has not been
made out by a preponderance of the evidence,
(Italics ours) the action should be dismissed,
which makes the question, one of fact."
These three most recent Federal cases interpreting
Rule 41 (b) which is the same as our Rule 41 (b) and
as applied under Rule 1 (a) are exactly in point with the
case at bar, and are conclusive.
The testimony of Clarence R. Miller who was called
as an expert witness for appellant is both ambiguous and
contradictory. At page 14 of the transcript, also cited
by appellant, Mr. Miller testified on direct examination
concerning the filter unit taken from the cylinder in crank
12
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ea::;e, which ::;aid filter wa~ umrked plaintiff'::; Exhibit D.
.He fir::;t testified:

.. Q. ..:-\.nd did you see the Exhibit D ~~xtnwted fron1
the cylinder 1
A.

Yes.

Q. * * * * I call your attention to the bag to a point
about a foot up on the bag where the bag seen1s to be torn.
X ow, will you tell us where that piece of cloth or that part
of the bag was located as far as this pan is concerned at
the tune you first observed it!
A.

"\V ell, we had to pull it out.

This part here was

out in the discharge hole.

Q. When you say ··this part here'' point to the area.
A.

You can see the rings.

Q. Around the holes and wrinkles around the hole.
A. Yes.

Q. And that was inside the discharge hole. Is that
correct~

A.

Yes.''

The witness, Miller, then changed his testimony and
admitted his prior statements were incorrect when on
pages 18 and 19 he testified that it was ilnpossible to see
where the bag was. This testimony, still on direct exanlination, now is as follows:

'' Q.

You know what had caused the creasing or

whPre that part of the bag had been?

A.

Only one place it could have been, is up that

13
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hole, but ymt can't see behind there to see whether it was.
You have to pull it out if you have a restriction." (Italics
ours).
Mr. ~filler's testimony is further weakened and nmde
more ambiguous by his answer on direct exa1uination as
to how the bag allegedly got off the spool and into the
discharge hole. His testilnony on pages 19 and 20 is this :

'• Q. Now then, do you have an opinion as to what
caused the bag to get in the discharge hole and off the
spool¥
A.

* * * *Yes.

Q.

All right, what is your

opinion~

A. The bag had to get behind the end blade of this
spool here in order to get in the discharge hole.
THE COURT:

All right:

A. And I don't know of any other way it could have
got there unless it was out there to start with when the
bag was installed." (Italics ours).
Mr. l\1:iller did not state anywhere in his testimony
that he saw the discharge hole blocked, or saw the bag
improperly wrapped. In effect it was his opinion that
he knew of no other way it could have happened. He then
contradicted himself again and changed his testimony by
stating that it was possible for the bag to slip. This is
shown by his testimony on pages 21 and 22 of the transcript.

"Q. Now, you say that, in your opinion, that (the
edge of the bag) got over the end of that plate in the

14
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beginning, you mean at the ti1ne of installation.
A.

That is what I believe.

Q. ~ow, will you show us by denwnstrating with
the bag in which 1nanner that occurred, in your opinion 7
• * ••
A. It '.s pos.sible that it could have slipped in that
position, I'm not saying that it did."' (Italics ours)
By this last answer the witness contradicts all of
his other testilnony and states that the bag could have
~lipped so that the bag could have gotten, into the dis-.
charge hole, which in his opinion, is what caused the
damage to the engine.

Plaintiff and appellant's second witness, Leslie Holt,
also failed to show that he saw the discharge hole plugged,
or the sack in the hole, or the bag improperly wrapped
by defendant's mechanic. At page 44 he stated:

'' Q.
hole?

* * * * Did you see the bag in the discharge

A. Didn't see the bag in there.
of it in there.

Q. You did.
A.

I seen the pieces

The pieces only!

That's right."

On cross examination Mr. Holt went on to admit
that the cmn shaft regulator could be defective or plugged
with foreign material and build up excessively high pressure. On page 54 of the transcript, he testified as follows:

'' Q.

In other words, if your regulator is defective,

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

likely it would build up more than 60 pounds'?

A. 1t would build up excessive pressure.
Q. And it 1nay build up an excessively high pressure if your valve is defective.
A.
sure.

If it was plugged it would increase your pres-

Q. Or some foreign material becmne fast in your
oil line. That could also.
A.

That would build up pressure in your filter, yes.

Q. And undoubtedly would, would it not?
A. It would build up excess pressure.
render your by pass valve useless.''

It would

"Q. And it would build up sufficient pressure to
explode that oil bag. That is, it may.''
The court ( we think erroneously) sustained an objection to that question as incompetent, irrelevant and
immaterial. T. Pg. 54. The witness further testified
that the longer the bag was used without a change of oil
the more pores in the bag would become clogged with
sludge and carbon particles, he did not see the bag or
spool, Exhibit D, installed, but said the spool was properly installed and fastened as far as he could see externally when he saw the engine after the damage was done.
T. Pg. 56 and 57.
The third expert witness, called by plaintiff and appellant, was William R. lVIcLelland who did not see the
engine in question, and who was not there when it was
torn down. He did not see a blocked oil line nor the posi-
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tion of the bag when it wa~ reu10ved. His te~tiuwny on
the da1nage to the engine and what caused such dautage
was incmnpetent and should be ignored. Appellant's
state1nent in his argmnent on page ~4 that this witne~s
stated the bag had been sucked into the discharge line
and blocked said line cmnpletely is absolutely incorrect
and should be disregarded.
The witness did say, however, in answer to the ques-·
tion •·how long it would take a bearing being starved of
oil, pulling loads uphill, to burn out or be destroyed.
A. \Vell, if the oil is blocked off it's just a u1atter
of seconds, I would say."
It is obvious from close examination and correct

interpretation of the transcript of testimony that there
is absolutely no direct evidence that defendant and
respondents mechanic improperly or negligently
wrapped the filter bag in question. There is absolutely
no direct evidence that the oil line was plugged or that
the filter bag plugged it. To the contrary, :Mr. Miller,
on cross-examination, stated that the filter bag' could
have slipped into the position that plaintiff and appellant allege defendant's mechanic had wrapped it.
This Court, in Putnam v. Industrial Commission 80
Utah 187, 14 P (2d) at page 981 decided in 1932, held
that the testimony of a witness is no stronger than his
testimony on cross-examination in the following words:
''The familiar rule is applicable that the testimony
of a witness on his direct examination is no stronger
than as modified or left by his further examination
or by his cross-examination."
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ln the absence of direct testiuwny as to any negligence of defendant's employee, the absence of direct
testimony that the oil line was plugged or that the filter
bag was in said hole, coupled with the witness Holt's
admission, on cross-exmnination, that the bag could have
slipped, and the mileage the truck had traveled and the
use to which it had been put, the trial court correctly
g-ranted a nonsuit against plaintiff on the merits. The
trial court heard all of plaintiff's evidence, weighed it,
and decided that, under the facts and law, plaintiff ought
not to prevail. The trial court as trier of the law and
the facts ought not be forced to hear defendant's case
when he has not been convinced that plaintiff should
prevail.
Appellant's citations, upon which he based his appeal, have no bearing on this case. First, said citations
were all taken from jury cases as distinguished from this
instant case which was a non-jury trial. Secondly, each
of his cases was based on the law under the repealed
code-section, having been replaced by our Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure which were copied from the Federal
Rules.
Appellant's contention that the motion made for a
non-suit was not sufficient in detail is without merit. Rule
4:1 (b) as cited above, states that the defendant
'' * * * * may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief.''
In the instant case, defendant moved for a nonsuit and
dismissal
"upon the grounds and for the reason that there has
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been no negligence shown or proved to the eourt
sufficient to 1uake a pri1ua faeie ea~e''
and upon the further ground
··that the eYidence of the plaintiff it~elf shows contributory negligence.''
Tliis n10tion i~ n10re ~Pl'eifir than that required by the
rules and i~ certainly sufficient for the court to grant a
non-suit. In any event, the plaintiff and appellant n1ade
no offer of further testimony, nor did he ask in what
particulars his case was wanting, nor did he ask for a
new trial. It is clear this appeal is without merit.
Plaintiff's evidence also ~hows affirmatively
(1) That the truck in question made regular trips
after defendant serviced it as follows: January 25th, to
Idaho Falls, Idaho ; 26th, Rock Springs, Wyoming; 29th,
Burley and Rupert, Idaho; 30th, Pocatello, Idaho; and
31st, 'Vattis, Utah, Exhibit F, and February 1st Spring
Canyon, Utah Exhibit G. T. Pg. 63.
(2) The capacity of the trailers being pulled by it
ranged from 4500 to 5700 gallons.
T. Pg. 74 and 76.
(3)
grades.

Some of these hauls were over long and heavy
T. Pg. 76.

( 4) And at speeds up to 50 miles per hour and on
hills as low as 10 miles per hour.
T. Pg. 77.
All of which necessarily putting a terrific strain on
the motor and the oil filter, for considerable of the whole
2190 miles traveled by it after being serviced. During
all that time the motor functioned smoothly and
normally.
T. Pg. 64 and 65.
( 5)

The oil used in servicing the motor by the de19
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fendant was plaintiff's own oil purchased b~· him from
Phillips 66.
T. Pg. 69 and 70, and

( 6) Plaintiff's agent, Woolslayer, delivered the
truck to defendant and watched it being serviced. T.
Pg. 67. He testified it was his duty to renmin with and
wateh it being serviced.
T. Pg. 69. He saw nothing
wrong with the manner in which it was ~erviced or he
would ha \'e testified to that fact. lie admitted that he
helped to service it.
T. Pg. 69.
Plaintiff's witness, Miller, who undertook to wrap
the filter as he thought it must have been wrapped by
defendant, said:

'• Q. * * * * Now, were you or were you not very
conscious of the fact that was sticking out of the end!
A. I imagine I did. I rolled it on purpose, didn't
I. * * * *

Q. You were extremely conscious of the fact that
the bag was over there~

A.

Yes.

Q. And if you had wound the bag like that, not
knowing that you had so wound it and put it in there,
you would im1nediately be called to the attention that
the bag was sticking over the end or the point, wouldn't
you~

A.

That's right, yes." * * * *

The charge here, it rnust be remembered, is a negligent installation, not an intentional and deliberate wrongdoing as this witness testified to.
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He also testified that it wa~ an ··old uwtor,,, he
'r. Pg. :~r>.
didn't know .. ,vhen it wa~ worked on last,_
That cold oiln1ay blow the filter bag out.

'1\ Pg. 39.

The bag can uwve under oil pressure.

rl\ Pg. 40.

Plaintiff'~

witness, Holt, in testifying how he
thought the filter bag wa~ installed agreed with .Miller
that such installation would have had to have been intentional and deliberate.

· •Q. Kow, you have wrapped the filter bag and the
spacer unit in the n1anner in which you think it was
wrapped when it was installed on January 2-l, 1951, at
Slim Olson's ¥
~\.

Yes, that's right.

Q.

Is that correct!

A.

That's the way I believe it was.

Q. In wrapping that, you have deliberately pulled
a portion of the bag out over the ear in the flange. Is
that right?

A. Yes.
Q. And you had to wrap and unwrap that five or
six times and deliberately pull that out to get it wrapped
that way, didn't you?
A.

Q.

I did that time.
That is the way you think this bag was

installed~

A. Yes.
Q. And if it were wrapped the way you have indicated it was wrapped and for you to wrap it that ,,·ay.

21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

it would have to be intentionally and consciously done
that way.
A.

Yes. * * *

*"

T. Pg. 50.

Again,
Being asked about whether, when the engine was
started up pumping the oil into the filter bag it would
inflate the bag up evenly throughout and iron out any
wrinkles, said -

" Q. Wouldn't it iron out all the
A.

wrinkles~

It's possible.

Q. Blow them up like you blow air into a paper
bag and fill in all the wrinkles and even it out, wouldn't
it~

A.

'' Q.
A.

I presume it would, yes.'' * * •)(: *

T. Pg. 52.

The answer is 'yes'.
Yes.''

T. Pg. 53."

He further testified that would happen the first
time the motor was started up and every other time
it was started during the full 2190 miles. T. Pg. 53. * * *
He clearly showed a way other than that testified
to by Miller and others in which the lines could be clogged
- stopping the flow of oil to the engine and causing the
dmnage complained of.
Also, the witness, Holt, testified similarly upon being
recalled as follows :

"Q. So that if the discharge pipe to the cmn shaft
became clogged with sludge or something else, there
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would be no place for the oil to go except to build up
such pressure that son1ething would break.
A. S01uething would have to break. That pump
has a capacity of about 15 gallons per minute.

Q. -w. herever the clogging occurred between the
spool, exhibit D, and the ca1nshaft, it would have that
smne result!
A.

You would build up back pressure.

Q. Now, assu1ning, ~Ir. Holt,- that is hypothetical
now. Assuming that the line to the camshaft becmne
clogged and built up a terrific pressure in the cylinder,
Exhibit C, and then was suddenly released, there would
be a tendency for oil to rush under that extreme pressure
Yery quickly and fast into the outlet from the spool in
the cylinder, Yery quickly. Is that true~

A.

I imagine that would be."

That being the case then, under those circu1nstances,
the filter bag, being properly installed, could be forced
under that extreme pressure into the discharge line
clogging it and resulting in the damage complained of.

ARGUl\IENT ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Specifically denying any sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of defendant, but for the sake of this
argument in the event evidence of negligence upon any
theory should be found, we think it pertinent here to inelude son1e of the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses on
eross exan1ination with respect thereto.

"Q. (Mr. Aadneson) Are you willing to stipulate
as to what the 1nileage of the truck in question was front
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the time of service until the time of plugging?
Mr. Burton: Yes. We have that 2190 Iniles. rro
save time; I think that's 2190 Iniles. I wrote that down."

T. Pg. 31.

Cross-examination
~lr.

Miller

"Q. Your indulgence a minute, Mr. l\filler, how
often should this oil filter bag be changed?

A.

I recommend every oil change.

Q. Do you have a lubricating standard for Cummings motors f
A.

Yes.

Q.

IIow often does it recmmnend an oil

A. We recommend Cuininings Company¥

Q.

You.

change~

are you talking about the'

What do you recmnmend'

A. The customer usually decides.
anywhere from 1500 to 2500.

Q.

Oil change 1

A.

Yes.

We recommend

Q. Do you have a knowledge of what Cummings
recommends 1
THE COURT: They have that here. There's
no need of asking that.
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Q.

\\"ill you 8tipulate what the recouuuendation is:

.MR. Bl!HTO.N: Yes. If you have anything to
clai1n for it. It's every 500 gallons.
1\lR HUUGINS:

What?

A. Every 500 gallons of fuel oil. If you get 5 1niles
T. Pg. 33 and 34.
a gallon you will get what'?"
Cross examination.

Th01nas H. Mitchell

"Q. Then how long did you run the 1notor, you say,
before you threw the truck in gear and started 1noving
the truck itself~
A.

Oh, I ilnagine 2 or 3 minutes.

Q. Didn't hear anything of an unusual nature then.
A.

No.

Q.

Then you threw it in gear and started nwving.

A.

That's correct.

Q. And where were you when you heard or saw
or noticed anything of an unusual nature~
A.

Well, I just got back on and just got going.

Q. What did you hear finally that called your attention to the fact that something was perhaps wrong~
. A. Well, I heard something like a bearing going out
and temperature rising and oil pressure left, and the
only thing you could do is stop."
T. Pg. 90.
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Theone Green testified direct

'' Q. VVas there anything unusual in the operation
of the truck during that distance t (five or six miles
between Phillips and Standard).
A. I never noticed anything until I approached the
loading dock at Standard Oil.

Q.

All right.

Then what did you

notice~

A. Well, I detected a slight, what I called a knocking noise, different to the norn1al sound of the engine.

Q.

And what did you do at the time?

A. Well, I went ahead and pulled into the dock
and loaded my truck and after I was loaded I pulled out
from the dock so those behind me could load, and stopped
the engine and pulled the dip stick on the engine to see
if the oil supply was normal, see if I had a normal
supply of oil, if it was up to level.

* * * *

:j[:

Q. What is the next thing you did 1
A. Then I started back to the highway frmn the
refinery, down to the road to get on the highway and
keeping a check on the oil gauge to see if smnething was
wrong."
T. Pg. 96.
Q.

All right.

What did you see 1

A.

The oil stayed up to normal.
THE COURT : Proceed clear to where you

stopped.
A.

I proceeded south from the refinery approXI26
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mat ely a 1nile, I would ::;ay, where you turn left across
the tracks at Beck'::; Hot Springs then onto highway 91,
and I proceeded north about a m.ile and a half, I would
say. and occasionally, one or two tilnes I detected knocking, or thought I did, and when I got about a 1nile north,
or a 1nile and a half north, to the ti1ne I stopped, the oil
gauge fluctuated, started to fall off. I started losing
power. I pulled the c01npression gauge on the engine
and stopped it.''
Cross exanrination.

T. Pg. 97.

·' Q. Did the engine continue to knock until you
stopped at the dock for your load at Standard 1
.A.. No. Just a slight knock intermittently.
wasn't a steady knock.
T. Pg. 125.

It

Q. You didn't stop the 1notor to determine what
was causing the knocking1
A. I stopped it as I pulled up to the dock just a
few feet after I heard it.

Q. Did you call a mechanic at that time to come and
inspect the car 1
A.

No, I didn't.

Q. You are not a mechanic.
A.

No, sir.

Q. And of course you realized at that time you were
not a mechanic?
A.

Right.
27
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Q. Did you realize you were operating an expensive piece of machinery¥
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Yet, not withstanding you heard this unusual
knocking, you called no mechanic to see what the trouble
was.
A.

I didn't call him then, no.

* * * * *
Q. In full knowledge you had some kind of motor
trouble you pulled out with a load.
A.

I didn't think I had 1notor trouble.

T. Pg. 106.

* * * * *
Q. 'Vhen did you first notice the knocking sound
again¥
A. Well, the first heavy knocking I got was when
I approached, started on highway 91.

Q.

Where was the first light knocking 1
court intervene. * "" * *

A. I noticed it as I was proceeding from Standard
Oil, after and on, but not heavy until I got to highway
91 and proceeded north.
T. Pg. 107.
Butte v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co. 14 Ut. 477 p. 77,
78, it was held that
''while the defendant may have been quilty of negligence that contributed to the injury complained of,
it is clear that the plaintiff's negligence also contributed to the same injury * * * * where there is no
evidence of the existance of a fact essential to a
reco{er, or when the evidence establishes a fact fatal
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I~

II
I

I,

to a recovery with such certainty as to leave no
reasonable doubt in the u1inds of fair 1nen, the court
should grant a nonsuit, or, if the case is subrnitted to a
jury, instruct a verdict for the defendant.''
CONCLUSION
\Ye have printed in our brief several exerpts fron1
plaintiff's \vitnesses showing conflicting statmnents, also
developing, as far as the trial court would pennit, that
there were other \Yays in which the damage could have
resulted, in refutation of their direct testimony on direct
examination that ''they knew of no other way the dan1age
could have been caused.'' It necessarily follows then
that, as left upon cross-exmnination, there was no testimony of such a nature to convince the learned trial court
that any negligence was shown. Consider this with the
further testimony that plaintiff's own agent watched and
helped the defendant service the engine and he saw nothing wrong with the manner in which it was serviced, and
also with the evidence of plaintiffs witness of the manner in which they operated the truck 2190 miles after
it was serviced, and under considerable strain and varied
conditions even after indisputable and audible evidence on
the night of February 2nd that something had gone
wrong with the n1otor we must conclude then and we
submit that:
The court sitting without a jury, having heard
all of the plaintiff's evidence correctly concluded that
the plaintiff had not convincingly shown a right to relief
- as the rule was construed in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co. supra.
1.
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1

l

2. The evidence of plaintiff clearly show~ negligence on his part in the operation of the truck, but
~hows no negligence on the part of defendant.
3. The motion for nonsuit was more fully stated
that required under our rules of civil procedure as construed by the Federal courts.

I

4. Plaintiff's theory of the case and the cases cited
by him are clearly not in point under Rules 1 (a) and 41
(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
5. This Supreme Court in its most recent case of
Liquor Control Commission v. Chris E. Athis and C. V.
Lack, No. 7738 and Filed April10, 1952, has followed the
construction placed by the Federal Courts on its Rules,
in the construction of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
which are, to all intents and purposes, verbatum.
6.

The motion for nonsuit was properly granted.
Respectfully subn1itted,
HUGGINS & HUGGINS
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